Sahel: the rise of JNIM, a new security reality for European operators

The withdrawal of French forces from the Sahel and the dissolution of MINUSMA did not create a vacuum — they accelerated a reconfiguration. The primary beneficiary of this reconfiguration is JNIM, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist coalition whose territorial expansion is redefining the security framework for every European operator still present in the Sahel belt.

A reconfigured theatre after the Western withdrawal

Between 2022 and 2024, the Sahelian security landscape underwent a structural transformation. The withdrawal of Barkhane, the end of Takuba, and the dissolution of MINUSMA in December 2023 removed the three pillars of the international security architecture in the region. In parallel, the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger broke with Paris and reoriented their partnerships toward Moscow — without this reorientation producing tangible results on the ground.

The result is a space in which non-state armed groups operate with increased freedom of movement. National armed forces, despite an aggressive sovereigntist discourse, struggle to control entire territories. Central Mali, northern Burkina Faso and the tri-border area are now spaces where state authority is either absent or contested.

The post-2023 Sahel is not a security vacuum. It is a competitive space between armed actors where the state is one competitor among many — and rarely the most effective.

JNIM: structure, footprint, expansion strategy

JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) was founded in March 2017 under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, a historic Tuareg figure turned pivot of the jihadist insurgency in Mali. The coalition brings together four entities: Ansar Dine, the Macina katiba (led by Amadou Koufa), Al-Mourabitoun and AQIM's Saharan emirate. This confederal structure is its primary asset: it allows JNIM to operate simultaneously across different ethnic and geographic contexts while maintaining a flexible command unity.

Affiliation with the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) network provides a global ideological framework, but JNIM functions first and foremost as a local actor. Its strategy rests on three pillars:

• Community embeddedness. Unlike the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), JNIM favours integration into local social dynamics. It negotiates with communities, offers mediation and justice services, and leverages inter-communal tensions (Fulani/Dogon, herders/farmers) for recruitment.
• Progressive territorial control. JNIM does not seek systematic frontal confrontation. It establishes itself in areas where the state is absent, imposes de facto governance, then extends its perimeter through contiguity. Central Mali and the entirety of northern Burkina Faso are now under direct or indirect JNIM influence.
• Integrated war economy. Taxation of trade routes, control of livestock markets, levies on artisanal gold mining. JNIM has built an autonomous economic base that makes it less dependent on external funding than other jihadist organisations.

The geographic expansion is significant. While JNIM historically structured itself in Mali, its footprint in Burkina Faso is now massive — the country currently accounts for the highest number of armed incidents attributed to the group according to ACLED data. The extension into north-western Niger, already underway in 2023, accelerated after the Niamey coup in July 2023 and the consequent disorganisation of Niger's security forces.

2024-2025 developments: intensification and reconfiguration

2024 marked an inflection point. According to ACLED data compiled over the period, attacks attributed to JNIM increased by 30 to 40% in volume compared to 2023, with a notable southward expansion of the area of operations — the Sikasso region in Mali, the Cascades and South-West in Burkina Faso, and border areas with Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin.

In parallel, the rivalry with ISGS has intensified. The two organisations are competing for control of the tri-border area (Mali-Burkina-Niger) and the Liptako-Gourma. This intra-jihadist competition manifests in direct clashes between fighters of both movements, population displacement and a worsening of insecurity in contested corridors. The UN Secretary-General's report S/2024/901 documents this dynamic and notes that the fragmentation of the jihadist landscape complicates any attempt at negotiation or stabilisation.

The JNIM-ISGS rivalry is not good news for regional security. Two organisations in competition multiply operations to demonstrate capability — and civilians as well as economic operators are caught in the crossfire.

In early 2025, JNIM demonstrated its ability to conduct complex operations: coordinated attacks on military garrisons, ambushes on major road axes, and temporary seizure of towns. The group has also strengthened its communications apparatus, producing more sophisticated propaganda content aimed at local recruitment and legitimising its governance.

Impact on European operators

For European businesses and investors still present in the Sahel belt, this evolution demands a complete reassessment of risk. Several sectors are directly exposed:

• Mining and gold panning. JNIM taxes artisanal gold panning sites and controls access to certain gold-bearing areas. Industrial operators (gold mines in Burkina Faso, lithium projects in Mali) face risks of extortion, kidnapping of personnel and operational disruption.
• Energy and infrastructure. Linear infrastructure projects (pipelines, power lines, roads) cross areas where freedom of movement is no longer guaranteed. Construction sites are potential targets — both for equipment and for their demonstration effect.
• NGOs and international organisations. After MINUSMA, humanitarian organisations are often the last international presence in certain areas. JNIM oscillates between tactical tolerance (when humanitarian aid serves its governance interests) and hostility (when the international presence is perceived as an obstacle).
• Logistics corridors. The Abidjan-Ouagadougou axis, the Lome-Ouagadougou corridor and Burkina's north-south supply routes are under increasing threat. Insurers have begun reassessing their premiums for freight transport along these corridors. Some now refuse to cover specific routes.

The risk of kidnapping European nationals remains high. JNIM has historically used hostage-taking as a lever for financing and political negotiation. The severing of diplomatic channels between the juntas and European capitals considerably complicates any crisis management in the event of an incident.

Weak signals to monitor

Several emerging dynamics warrant structured attention from analysts and decision-makers:

• Reconfiguration of tribal alliances. JNIM relies on opportunistic alliances with community armed groups. Any shift in alliance — particularly among Tuareg groups in northern Mali or Dozo militias in Burkina — instantly alters the local security balance.
• Evolution of the Wagner/Africa Corps footprint. The rebranding of Wagner as Africa Corps under Russian GRU oversight has not improved operational effectiveness on the ground. Russian mercenaries operate primarily around economic points of interest (mines) and capitals, leaving rural areas to JNIM. Any change in this posture — withdrawal, reinforcement, shift of zone — has direct consequences on the security map.
• Response from the military juntas. The regimes in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey ground their legitimacy on the security promise. Failure to contain JNIM could trigger internal political instability, further institutional ruptures or attempts at discreet negotiation with jihadist groups — each scenario carrying distinct implications for operators.
• Spread toward coastal states. Benin, Togo, Ghana and Ivory Coast are detecting growing activity in their northern zones. The Sahelian contagion toward the Gulf of Guinea is the scenario most closely watched by regional intelligence services. For European operators present in these countries, this means the threat is no longer confined to the Sahel stricto sensu.

What decision-makers must factor in

The Sahelian environment no longer tolerates approximation. European operators maintaining activities in the region — or considering entry — must integrate the following elements into their decision process:

• Structured security monitoring. A minimum weekly watch, cross-referencing ACLED data, OSINT sources, field intelligence and analysis of political dynamics. Quarterly bulletins are no longer sufficient: the situation evolves in weeks, sometimes days.
• Operational evacuation plans. Not a theoretical document in a drawer, but a tested plan with rally points, validated exit corridors and reliable local contacts. The closure of Malian airspace to French military flights in 2022 demonstrated that evacuation options can disappear within hours.
• Enhanced due diligence on local partners. In an environment where the lines between state actors, militias, armed groups and economic operators are blurred, traceability of partners is an imperative. Who are the security subcontractors? Who controls the supply routes? What are the links between local partners and armed actors?
• Insurance reassessment. Standard insurance policies do not cover current risks in the Sahel belt. A specific analysis of exclusions and negotiation of coverage terms are essential before any deployment.
• Dialogue with state services. European companies must maintain a channel of exchange with the relevant services of their home country (DGSE, BND, SIS) and with the crisis cells of foreign affairs ministries. In the event of an incident, the speed of the response depends on the quality of pre-existing links.

The Sahel has not become impassable. But it has become an environment where the cost of ignorance is no longer acceptable. The difference between an operator who manages risk and one who suffers it comes down to the quality of their intelligence.

The rise of JNIM is a structural fact, not a cyclical episode. The conditions that enabled its expansion — Western withdrawal, state fragility, jihadist rivalry, capturable informal economy — are not on a path to resolution. European operators who choose to remain in this environment need a continuous, independent and operational reading of the situation. This is precisely what economic intelligence applied to degraded contexts is for.