Strait of Hormuz: Iranian tensions and impact on African growth

← Back to insights

Since the return of the Trump administration in January 2025, American policy toward Iran has reverted to a maximum pressure logic. Reimposition of secondary sanctions, effective withdrawal from the residual JCPOA framework, designation of new entities linked to the Revolutionary Guards: Washington has chosen a head-on confrontation with Tehran. By spring 2026, this escalation reaches a critical threshold. The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 21% of global oil and a quarter of internationally traded liquefied natural gas transit, becomes once again the epicentre of systemic risk for the global economy. But it is on the African continent, structurally dependent on energy imports and maritime freight costs, where the domino effect could prove most devastating.

1. The Strait of Hormuz: strategic overview

The Strait of Hormuz separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula across a width of 33 kilometres at its narrowest point. Two navigation channels of 3 kilometres each, separated by a 3-kilometre buffer zone, constitute the corridor through which between 20 and 21 million barrels of crude oil transit daily — equivalent to one fifth of global consumption. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar depend on it for the bulk of their hydrocarbon exports.

Iran possesses significant asymmetric disruption capability: naval mines, Revolutionary Guards fast attack craft, coastal anti-ship missiles, and a network of maritime drones tested during the 2019 incidents. That year, the "tanker wars" saw attacks on six merchant vessels within two months, the downing of a US MQ-4C Triton drone, and the seizure of the British tanker Stena Impero. The risk is not theoretical: it is documented, recent, and reproducible.

The Strait of Hormuz is not merely an oil transit point. It is the thermostat of the global economy — and Iran has its hand on the dial.

2. Tension scenario: the US-Iran escalation in 2026

The Trump 2.0 administration has accelerated the pace of sanctions since the second half of 2025. Iranian oil exports, which had recovered to a level of 1.5 million barrels per day through circumvention via dark fleets and ship-to-ship transfers, are the target of an unprecedented tracking campaign. Washington has strengthened satellite surveillance of circumvention routes, expanded OFAC designations to Chinese and Emirati broker networks, and deployed an additional carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf in early 2026.

Iran's posture is one of calibrated deterrence. Tehran has no interest in closing the strait — that would be an act of war — but has every interest in maintaining permanent ambiguity about its capability and willingness to do so. Naval exercises are multiplying, official rhetoric regularly invokes the possibility of "controlling the flow" in the event of an existential threat, and incidents of harassment of merchant and military vessels in the strait are up 40% compared to 2024 according to Lloyd's List data.

For maritime insurers, this sequence translates into concrete figures. The war risk premium for Strait of Hormuz transit has been revised upward several times since late 2025. Insurance surcharges for a single passage can reach 0.5 to 1% of cargo value — an order of magnitude which, applied to massive volumes, directly impacts FOB and CIF prices at destination.

3. Domino effect on Africa: the triple penalty

Structural energy dependence

The African continent, despite its considerable hydrocarbon reserves, remains a net importer of refined petroleum products. According to World Bank and EIA data, over 80% of African countries import all or nearly all of their petrol, diesel and kerosene. Installed refining capacity in Africa covers less than 40% of the continent's needs. Even Nigeria, Africa's leading crude oil producer, imports the majority of its refined products due to the chronic under-capacity of its refineries — a situation that the Dangote refinery, despite its ramp-up, only partially resolves.

Any tension on the global oil market is therefore mechanically transmitted to African economies, with an amplifying effect linked to the weakness of strategic reserves (most sub-Saharan countries have less than 30 days of stocks) and the absence of hedging mechanisms on commodity markets.

Rising logistics costs

Africa is the continent most dependent on maritime freight for its trade. Approximately 90% of African foreign trade transits by sea. A disruption at Hormuz, even partial, triggers a rerouting of flows, longer routes, scarcity of transport capacity and, ultimately, rising freight rates. The Baltic Dry Index and container indices have already demonstrated their sensitivity to this type of shock during the Red Sea crisis in 2024, when Houthi attacks triggered a massive diversion via the Cape of Good Hope.

When freight rises by 20%, it is the price of flour in Mombasa, cement in Dar es Salaam and generic medicine in Antananarivo that rises in the weeks that follow.

Generalised inflationary pressure

The combination of rising crude, rising freight and local currency depreciation (risk aversion pushing capital toward the dollar) constitutes a formidable inflationary cocktail for sub-Saharan economies. The IMF estimates that a 10% rise in the oil price translates, for Africa's net importing countries, into a 0.5 to 0.7 percentage point impact on inflation and a 0.3 point deterioration of the current account balance. In economies where food inflation already exceeds 15 to 20% in several countries, the effect is socially explosive.

4. Most exposed countries

• Nigeria — The producer-importer paradox. Africa's leading crude producer, Nigeria still imports a significant share of its refined products. The Dangote refinery ramp-up reduces this vulnerability but does not eliminate it. Any crude price rise improves export revenues but worsens the refined product import bill and the budget deficit linked to residual subsidies.
• Kenya — Near-total dependence on petroleum product imports via the port of Mombasa. Kenya is on the front line: no significant domestic production, limited reserves, and a logistics corridor (Northern Corridor) that also feeds Uganda, Rwanda and eastern DRC.
• East Africa (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda) — The Mombasa-Kampala logistics corridor and the port of Dar es Salaam constitute the region's vital arteries. Any rise in maritime costs cascades down to landlocked economies.
• Island economies (Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros) — Total dependence on maritime imports for energy and essential goods. No overland alternative. Stocks limited to 15-45 days depending on the country. Maximum vulnerability.
• Coastal West Africa (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana) — Net importers of refined products despite gas projects under development. Rising Atlantic freight, through substitution effects and fleet reallocation, also impacts these economies.

5. Impact on investment

For institutional investors, private equity funds and development finance institutions (DFIs) exposed to the African continent, a scenario of prolonged tension at Hormuz significantly alters the decision parameters.

Infrastructure project slowdown. Projects with a heavy energy and logistics component — power plants, roads, ports, industrial zones — see their business plans weakened by input cost volatility. Investment decision timelines mechanically lengthen.

Energy assumption revision. Financial models built on a $70-80 barrel must be stress-tested at $100-120. For rural electrification or diesel-powered transport projects, economic viability can tip.

Fund arbitrage. Capital allocators adjust their geographic exposure based on macro risk. A high energy risk premium on sub-Saharan Africa can divert flows toward markets perceived as less vulnerable — Southeast Asia, Latin America — even if the continent's long-term fundamentals remain favourable.

The Hormuz risk is not an African risk. But it is in Africa that it materialises fastest, hardest, and with the fewest shock absorbers.

6. Signals to monitor

For exposed operators and investors, several leading indicators enable real-time calibration of the risk level:

• US and Iranian naval deployments — Movements of the US carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea, Revolutionary Guards exercises, repositioning of fast attack craft and coastal batteries.
• Maritime freight prices — Baltic Dry Index, Shanghai-Mombasa and Rotterdam-Lagos container indices. A sustained 15-20% increase signals effective risk transmission.
• Maritime insurance risk premium — Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's quotations for the Persian Gulf zone. Any widening of the risk zone is a strong signal.
• Strategic reserves — Petroleum stock levels of target countries, IEA strategic reserve release announcements, and capacity for substitution via alternative supply routes.
• Sovereign bond spreads — African eurobonds are a barometer of market risk perception. A widening of spreads on Kenya, Nigeria or Ghana confirms the transmission of the geopolitical shock.
• Diplomatic communications — IAEA statements on the Iranian nuclear programme, UN Security Council exchanges, and signals of opening or closure of negotiation channels.

7. What decision-makers must anticipate

The question is not whether a major crisis at Hormuz will occur, but whether organisations are prepared for a scenario where the probability of disruption remains elevated for several quarters. Concrete recommendations:

Stress-test financial models. Any business plan exposed to sub-Saharan Africa must incorporate an oil scenario at $110-120/barrel and a 25% rise in freight costs over 12 months. FX assumptions must reflect downward pressure on local currencies.

Diversify supply sources. For operators dependent on suppliers transiting through Hormuz, identify alternative sources (West Africa, Mediterranean) and pre-negotiate conditional contracts.

Build or strengthen stockpiles. Companies operating on the continent with a dependence on diesel, heavy fuel oil or petroleum-based inputs must increase their safety stock levels to a minimum of 30 to 60 days.

Monitor force majeure clauses. In infrastructure and concession contracts, verify that force majeure and hardship clauses explicitly cover maritime disruption and secondary sanctions scenarios.

Integrate energy risk into due diligence. For any investment under evaluation, energy risk analysis — supply, costs, alternatives — must be treated as a first-order decision criterion, on a par with governance or conventional country risk.

Deploy dedicated monitoring. A structured monitoring framework, combining maritime OSINT, freight indicator tracking and diplomatic signal analysis, enables anticipation of risk windows and adjustment of operational decisions before the market imposes them.

In an environment where uncertainty is structural, the competitive advantage belongs to those who see the signal before the noise. Monitoring is not a cost — it is an insurance policy.

← Back to insights